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Abstract
People of Turkish ethnicity constitute Germany’s largest immigrant group but only a small percentage have
naturalized as German citizens This article explores the historical foundation of Turkish migration to Germany
and the legislative attempts made by both Germany and Turkey to accommodate these people with one foot in
each country. It argues that only by abandoning its long-held prejudice against dual citizenship can Germany
increase the naturalization rate of all foreigners in its country, not just those from Turkey.
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A. Introduction
On October 31, 1961, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Turkey signed an
agreement to promote the expedited hiring of Turkish citizens for jobs in Germany.1 The reason
for this: In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the German economy was flourishing—the “economic
miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder)—and experiencing a labor shortage. One of the solutions was a
series of agreements with countries in North Africa, Southeast Europe and the Balkans for the
provision of cheap labor, much of it unskilled and all of it thought by Germany to be temporary
in nature—therefore, the euphemism “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter).2
Fifty-seven years later, Turks are the largest ethnic minority group in Germany, numbering
nearly three million residents; only approximately 246,000 of them hold German citizenship.3
This Article focuses on the reasons for this low figure, the steps taken by both German and
Turkish governments to deal with this binational population, and the problems that have arisen.
First, a note about terminology. To social scientists, the word “citizenship” can include multiple
dimensions: Legal status, rights, political participation, and a sense of belonging.4 For our
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in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the M.A. in Turkish Studies. All translations from German are by the author. All
Internet sources were accessed on January 16, 2018.
© 2019 The Author. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the German Law Journal. This is an Open Access article, distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
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1Unless otherwise stated, “Germany” refers to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and does not include the German
Democratic Republic before that country was subsumed into the FRG on October 3, 1990.
2FARUK ŞEN & ANDREAS GOLDBERG, TÜRKEN IN DEUTSCHLAND: LEBEN ZWISCHEN ZWEI KULTUREN [TURKS IN GERMANY:
LIFE BETWEEN TWO CULTURES] 9 (1994) (stating labor agreements were reached with Italy (1955), Greece (1960), Spain (1960),
Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968)).
3Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund – Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2016 [Population with Migration Background –
Results of the Micro census of 2016], FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS 63 (2016) https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/
Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshintergrund2010220167004.pdf;jsessionid=0646332EA70C5CB
B98688BB718A6C657.cae1?__blob=publicationFile [hereinafter Migration].
4Irene Bloemraad, et al., Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State,
34 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 153, 154–56 (2008).
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purposes, we will speak exclusively of citizenship as legal status. This is an objective and easily
measured fact and does not require an inquiry into the subjective aspects of citizenship such as
identity and the extent to which a country’s citizens feel engaged with their government.
Citizenship—for our purposes—is that legal relationship of a person with a country that confers
the maximum scope of rights available in that country. These include the rights to remain perma-
nently, to be readmitted after an absence, to inherit and own property, to vote and to hold elective
office. The easiest identifier for this category: A citizen is a person eligible for a passport—an inter-
nationally recognized travel document that identifies the bearer as a citizen of the issuing country.5
B. “We sent for workers, but people came.”6
I. The genesis of the problem
When the thousands of Turkish workersmoved toGermany, the German government thought that
most would bemen, whowould work there for a few years, sendmoney back home, and then return
to Turkey with cash and new skills. Because the government believed their staywould be temporary,
no attempt wasmade to integrate them intoGerman society.Many lived in dormitories provided by
their employers, where they remained among themselves. They were not encouraged to learn the
German language beyond the bare minimum required to carry out their jobs.
In October 1973, the embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries set off a
worldwide recession fromwhich Germany was not exempt. The worker agreement with Turkey was
not renewed and the German government offered incentives to workers willing to move back to
their countries of origin. any Turks chose to remain, however.7 They began to regard their stay in
Germany as something long term, even if Turkey remained “home.” Many of the workers brought
wives and families to Germany. By 2002, only one-third of the Turks in Germany had arrived as
guest workers, approximately fifty-three percent of Turkish residents had immigrated to Germany
under family reunification visas, and seventeen percent were their descendants born in Germany.8
As the population in Germany of Turkish immigrants and their families increased, it became
clear that German citizenship law was keeping many of them permanently “foreign,” by making
accession to German citizenship tremendously difficult. The low rate at which Turks naturalized
raised concerns as to whether they were being prevented from fully integrating into German
society and the body politic. As will be seen, the two major barriers to Turks becoming
German citizens were the German prohibition of dual or multiple citizenship, and the failure
to extend birthright citizenship to the German-born children of immigrants.9
Over the years, German governments and Turkish organizations in Germany tried addressing
the perceived problem caused by the large number of Turkish heritage residents who had not
taken on German citizenship. Generally, the Germans saw the Turks’ failure to naturalize as
demonstrating a lack of attachment to Germany, while Turks maintained that it was the require-
ment of renouncing their Turkish citizenship that was the cause of the low naturalization rate.
5There are, of course, other travel documents issued by a country or organization—such as the Red Cross—that are
recognized for international travel but contain a disclaimer of nationality. For a history of the development of the passport,
see Kenneth Diplock, Passports and Protection in International Law, 32 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOC’Y 42, 44–52 (1946).
6Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, und es kamen Menschen, DER SPIEGEL (Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/
gastarbeiter-wir-riefen-arbeitskraefte-und-es-kamen-menschen-fotostrecke-74565-2.html (quoting Max Frisch).
7Statistisches Bundesamt, DATENREPORT 46 (1999), https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Datenreport/Downloads/
Datenreport1999.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (specifying that the end of the labor agreements and offers of assistance to
return resulted in decreases of the foreign-born population in Germany during several years in the mid-1970s and 1980s).
8Merih Anil, Explaining the Naturalization Practices of Turks in Germany in the Wake of the Citizenship Reform of 1999, 33
J. OF ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 1363, 1365 (2007).
9As will be seen below, even before the 1999 reform exceptions to the prohibition against multiple citizenship were made for
the benefit of citizens of other EU countries and of Switzerland.
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II. Citizenship: blood and soil
There are two primary ways in which citizenship is acquired at birth—jus sanguinis and jus soli.
Jus sanguinis refers to acquisition of citizenship through descent: Children, regardless of where
they are born, acquire at birth the citizenship of a parent. Jus soli is the doctrine that children
acquire the citizenship of the country in which they are born. Each country legislates its own
requirements for citizenship. The European Convention on Nationality, for example, provides,
“[e]ach State shall determine under its own law who are its nationals,” and requires all signatory
countries to accept others’ law on the subject insofar as consistent with generally-recognized
international law.10
Most countries operate a hybrid system conferring citizenship on some children born within
their borders, often subject to requirements about the legality or length of the parents’ presence in
the country at the time of the child’s birth and supplemented by granting citizenship to some
children born to citizen parents outside the country itself. Countries’ attitudes towards granting
citizenship based on either jus sanguinis or jus soli depend greatly upon whether they are tradi-
tionally sources or recipients of immigrants.11
At one extreme, Ireland is the epitome of a system for which jus sanguinis is the most important
factor. The Republic of Ireland grants citizenship to persons who have a single great-grandparent
born on the island of Ireland, subject to registration requirements.12 This is to be expected from a
country that has seen millions of its sons and daughters emigrate: There is an advantage in binding
those people and their descendants to the home country through provision of citizenship for the
children and grandchildren of emigrants. Emigrants are not only a source of remittances from
foreign work, which can help support the relatives at home, but they and their descendants
can act as a friendly lobby in the receiving countries.13
TheUnitedKingdomhas amixed system, extending British citizenship to children born in theUK
whose parents have a settled immigration status, but to just one generation of the children of
UK citizen parent(s) who were themselves born abroad.14 The United States—on the opposite
end from Ireland on the jus soli/jus sanguinis spectrum—grants under its constitution citizenship
to almost everyone born on American soil, regardless of the parents’ citizenship or immigration
status.15 Citizenship for children born to US citizen parents outside the country is created by statute
and has customarily required that the US citizen parent is physically present in the United States for a
certain length of time before the child’s birth in order for citizenship to be transmitted.16
10Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 2) 3, https://rm.coe.int/168007f2c8 [hereinafter Convention on
Nationality].
11ALBERT KRALER, The Legal Status of Immigrants and Their Access to Nationality, inMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: LEGAL
STATUS, RIGHTS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 44–45 (Rainer Bauböck ed., 2006).
12Qualifications for Citizenship by Birth or Decent, DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND EQUAL. IRISH NATURALISATION AND
IMMIGRATION SERV., http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/citizenship-greatgrandparent-born-ireland (stating that in 2004
Irish voters overwhelmingly approved (seventy-nine percent in favor, twenty-one percent against) the ending of birthright
citizenship for all babies born in Ireland, after claims that the liberal jus soli, unique in the EU, was being used to create Irish
citizenship for babies whose parents had no ties to Ireland); Angelique Chrisafis, Ireland tightens ring of steel around fortress
Europe, THE GUARDIAN (June 14, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/jun/14/eu.politics; TWENTY-SEVENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION ACT 2004 (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2004/ca/27/enacted/en/html (This
is a logical result from an ethnically homogeneous immigrant-sending nation).
13The Irish diaspora in the United States is the very archetype of a powerful immigrant lobby. See, e.g., PETER ANDERSON,
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POWER, JUSTICE AND DEATH 30–31 (2005).
14British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61, § 3(1), (3) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/3.
15U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States.”) (exempting those persons whose parents were at the time of the child’s birth
not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, such as the children of some diplomats).
16Immigration and Nationality Act § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952).
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III. German law before 2000 and the problems it caused
Traditionally, both Turkey and Germany are countries of emigration, not immigration, and as will
be seen below, both countries’ laws have traditionally defined citizenship in terms that suggest that
only persons with a certain ethnicity are real citizens. Until the new citizenship law came into
effect on January 1, 2000, the FRG was still operating under the same law of citizenship and
nationality—occasionally amended—that governed since 1913. Under that law, the primary route
to becoming a German citizen was to have at least one German parent. The limitation of German
birthright citizenship to transmission exclusively through descent therefore well predates Nazism,
although it is often misunderstood as a product of the racist Nazi era.17
Before January 1, 2000, children born in Germany to non-Germans—no matter how long the
parents’ stay had been—had no right to German citizenship. By contrast, under the German
constitution, the Basic Law, citizenship was offered to all persons descended from members of
the German Volk who were living in Germany in 1937:
A German in the sense of this Basic Law is, to the extent not otherwise regulated by law, a
person who possesses German citizenship [Staatsangehörigkeit] or a refugee or exiled person
of German nationality [Volkszugehörigkeit], or his spouse or descendant, who was living in
the area of the German Empire as constituted on 31 December 1937.18
The word Volk has acquired through its use by the National Socialists a taint that was not always
present. The idea of the German nation as “a romantically inspired community of common ethnic
and cultural descent” has its roots in the early 19th century, and this still-existing frame of mind
makes it difficult for many Germans to regard outsiders as real Germans.19 These people see their
country as a nation united by a common consciousness which an outsider cannot join any more
than a long-term boarder can become a blood relativemerely by years of living in the family home.20
Over the years, the German government has often declared that “Germany is not a country of
immigration.” Reality, however, has overtaken dogma. By the time of the 2015 micro census,
twenty-one percent of all German residents had a migration background—that is, either they
or at least one of their parents were not German citizens from birth.21
The major difficulty for Turks interested in German citizenship is the German aversion to
multiple citizenship because Turks are disinclined to renounce their birth citizenship to become
17See, e.g., Two Unamalgamated Worlds, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 3, 2008), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2008/04/03/
two-unamalgamated-worlds (“Even six decades after Hitler, Germany has not sloughed off the idea that Germanness is a
matter of blood rather than of culture or allegiance.”); AYHAN KAYA, Citizenship and the Hyphenated Germans: German-
Turks, in CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL WORLD: EUROPEAN QUESTIONS AND TURKISH EXPERIENCES 219, 219 (Emin F.
Keyman & Ahmet İçduygu eds., 2005) (referring to jus sanguinis and “the Nazi policies with which it came to be tragically
associated”).
18GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GG] [Basic Law] art. 116(1), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/bundesrecht/gg/gesamt.pdf (leading up to the 1999 law, more than one speaker pointed out the unfairness of denying dual
citizenship to migrants in Germany while “practically forcing it,” through the Basic Law, on German ethnics in Eastern
Europe); see, e.g., Bundestag debate at 3441 (May 7, 1999) (statement of Rep. Ulla Jelpke) http://dip21.bundestag.de/
dip21/btp/14/14040.pdf.
19Simon Green, Beyond Ethnoculturalism? German Citizenship in the NewMillennium, 9 GER. POL. 105, 106 (2000); see also
ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 9 (1992); for a discussion of the impact of the
Romantik Movement upon German law in general and the German Civil Code of 1900 in particular, see SG Gale, A Very
German Legal Science: Savigny and the Historical School, 18 STAN. J. OF INT’L L. 123 (1982).
20But see JÜRGEN GERDES ET AL., “We are all ‘Republican’ now”: The Politics of Dual Citizenship in Germany, in DUAL
CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE: FROM NATIONHOOD TO SOCIETAL INTEGRATION 47, 56–57 (Thomas Faist ed., 2007) (“[T]he
German concept of nation has undergone drastic changes” post-World War II and the dislike of naturalization and multiple
citizenship is explainable by other factors).
21Migration, supra note 3, at 4, 7 (The micro census is an annual survey of representative households in Germany amounting
to one percent of the total number of German residents, supplementing the general census performed every decade. Explanation
of the methodology at https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/Mikrozensus.html).
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German. The avoidance of multiple citizenship is not a uniquely German peculiarity—historically,
international law disfavored dual citizenship due to the possibility that the citizen could be caught
in a conflict of loyalties between his two countries. Until 1981, Turkish law also prohibited
multiple citizenships for its citizens.
Since 1913, the general rule has been that a foreigner wishing to acquire German citizenship
through naturalization must forfeit his previous citizenship, unless he can show extraordinary
circumstances that wouldmake the loss of that citizenship particularly burdensome or even impos-
sible.22 Similarly, a German citizen who naturalizes in a foreign country loses his German citizen-
ship unless, before naturalizing, he obtains a “permission to retain” (Beibehaltungsgenehmigung)
based upon a similar showing of hardship.23 Importantly, German citizens living in Germany
were exempt from this prohibition, which became known as the “domestic exemption”
(Inlandsklausel).24
IV. Turkish innovations
The current Turkish Constitution, in language consistent with the 1924 and 1961 versions, pro-
vides that “[e]veryone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.”25
This formulation disregards the fact that there are Turkish citizens who would not self-identify as
“Turks,”26 and echoes the early history of the Republic which was marked by numerous attempts
to create an ethnically homogeneous country.
In 1981, Turkey, aware of its identity as an emigrant country, changed its nationality law to
allow—for the first time—the possession of multiple citizenships.27 Provision is made for the easy
reacquisition of citizenship by Turks who renounce their citizenship in order to naturalize in a
foreign country—they can reacquire Turkish citizenship without any period of residence in
Turkey.28 A professor at Ankara University’s law faculty states that the allowance of multiple
citizenships was enacted expressly in response to the attempts by host countries to integrate
Turkish-origin residents by offering them citizenship.
22Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz [STaG] [Nationality Act], July 22, 1913, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBl] at § 10(1)(4) (require-
ment to lose or renounce), § 12(1) (exceptions to the requirement).
23For the current law, see StaG § 17(1)(2) (loss of citizenship upon naturalization in a foreign country), & § 25 (explaining
conditions under which permission to naturalize while retaining German citizenship will be granted), http://dip21.bundestag.
de/dip21/btd/18/107/1810788.pdf; see also Barbara Pusch, Dual citizenship in the transnational German-Turkish space: Notes
from Germany, IPC-MERCATOR POL. BRIEF 2 (Feb. 2015), http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/en-old/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
Barbara-push-feb_son1.pdf (stating naturalization with dual citizenship has long been possible for nationals of EU countries
and Switzerland where allowed to Germans on a reciprocal basis).
24Verlust der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit bei Wiedereinburgerung durch ausländische Staaten, [Loss of German citizenship
by reacquisition of foreign citizenship] DRUCKSACHE [DOCUMENT] 15/5006 at 2 (explaining the process in the German govern-
ment’s answer to a CDU/CSU Parliamentary question); bundestag publications before 18 October 2005 are available at http://
dip.bundestag.de.
25TURK. CONST. part 2, c. 4, art. 66, https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf; for the 1924 and 1961 provisions,
see, respectively, Edward M. Earle, The New Constitution of Turkey, 40 POL. SCI. Q. 73, 98 (Mar. 1925) (art. 88), http://www.
anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf (part 2, § 4, art. 54); for a historical overview, see Ahmet İçduygu, et al., What is the
Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate, 35 MIDDLE E. STUD. 187, 192–97 (1999).
26Zeynep Kadirbeyoğlu, Country Report: Turkey, EUDO CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY 3 (2012), http://www.foyer.be/IMG/
pdf/EUDO-2009-Turkey-linked.pdf (describing this as a “fabricated umbrella identity).
27Turkish Citizenship Law 2009, L. No. 5901, art. 44 § 1, http://globalcit.eu/wp-content/plugins/rscas-database-eudo-gcit/?
p=file&appl=currentCitizenshipLaws&f=TUR%20Turkish%20citizenship%20law%202009%20%28English%29.pdf (Turk.)
(providing a version of the English translation commissioned by the European Union Democracy Observatory of the law as
it stood on May 29, 2009); İNCI ATAMAN-FIGANMEŞE, Privat- und prozessrechtliche Folgen der doppelten Staatsangehörigkeit
nach turkischem Recht, [Private and Civil Procedural Effects of Dual Citizenship Under Turkish Law] in AUSWIRKUNGEN DER
DEUTSCHEN STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEITSREFORM [THE IMPACT OF GERMAN CITIZENSHIP LAW REFORM] 67, 67 (2002).
28Turkish Citizenship Law art. 13 § 1.
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[In the 1980s], given the sizeable number of Turkish immigrant workers in Western
European countries intending to live with their dependents in those countries, it became
necessary to introduce dual citizenship into Turkish law. Therefore, the Turkish population
living abroad acted as a catalyst for the formation of citizenship policies for the period of 1980
to 2000.29
To assist citizens wishing to naturalize in a country that requires renouncing their Turkish
citizenship, Turkey developed two legal methods. The first was Article 13 which allowed
Turks to easily reacquire Turkish citizenship whilst retaining their German or other foreign
citizenship. After long-term residence in Germany, they naturalized there, renouncing their
Turkish citizenship as required. Then, quietly, perhaps on the next trip back to Turkey, the newly
naturalized Germans reacquired their Turkish citizenship. Because of the domestic exemption,
individuals did not lose their German citizenship, and after 1981 were able to retain both.
This procedure was “supported and encouraged by Turkish authorities and embassies.”30
The second way in which the Turkish government assisted its citizens to acquire foreign
citizenships was through a 1995 amendment to Turkish law creating an ingenious almost-
citizenship which has been dubbed “citizenship light.”31 Known first as the “pink card” (pembe
kart), changed in 2004 to the “blue card” (mavi kart) and available only to former Turkish citizens,
it grants privileges not offered to other foreigners. These privileges include the rights to reside in
Turkey, inherit, carry out all trades and professions, and buy and sell property.
Those who had been Turkish citizens by birth but lost it by obtaining a renunciation permit
and their children transacted with them shall continue to enjoy, without prejudice to the
provisions relating to national security and public order, the rights accorded to the
Turkish citizens other than those, which are the responsibility of military service, the right
to vote and to be elected, the right to be employed in public office and the right to import
exempted vehicles and household goods, provided that their acquired rights relating to social
security are saved and they are subject to the provisions of the relevant laws in the use of
those rights.32
The drafter of the law that created the pink card told an interviewer that the status was created
at the request of the head of the Hamburg branch of the “Turkish Communities in Germany”
(Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland) (TGD) to find a way Turks living in Germany could take
on German citizenship without losing rights in Turkey.33
In practice, the pink/blue card has not been as helpful as expected. Users complain that
the Turkish bureaucracy was not instructed about the existence of this privileged status and so
the promised advantages never materialized.34 In addition, this status does not protect those
who might own or inherit property in military security areas, ownership remains restricted to
Turkish citizens. Turks have also expressed a lack of trust in the Turkish government to continue
to offer the pink/blue card.35 For these and other reasons, Turks who naturalized in Germany will
have preferred their own particular workaround: Renunciation of Turkish citizenship, then
naturalization in Germany, followed by reacquisition of Turkish citizenship and preservation
of German citizenship due to the domestic exemption.
29Bilgin Tiryakioğlu, Multiple Citizenship and its Consequences in Turkish Law, 3 ANKARA L. REV. 1, 6 (2006).
30Kadirbeyoğlu, supra note 26, at 4.
31AYŞE CAĞLAR, “Citizenship Light”: Transnational Ties, Multiple Rules of Membership, and the “Pink Card”, inWORLDS ON
THE MOVE: GLOBALIZATION, MIGRATION, AND CULTURAL SECURITY 273 (Jonathan Friedman & Shalini Randeria eds., 2004).
32Turkish Citizenship Law art. 28 § 1; see also CAĞLAR, supra note 31, at 279.
33Kadirbeyoğlu, supra note 26, at 6.
34Id. at 7.
35CAĞLAR, supra note 31, at 286.
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C. Germany’s citizenship law revolution
In 1999 the time was right, and indeed overdue, for Germany to reform its citizenship law. Societal
perception that long-term immigrants were failing to integrate into German society and to natu-
ralize as Germans was thought to be a problem with Turks particularly—and not only because
they make up the single largest minority ethnic group. The Turks were seen as distinctive and
problematic. They did not integrate well according to then Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who told
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1982 that he wanted to halve the number of Turks living
in Germany, as Germany could not assimilate the such a large number.36 Public discussion about
integration was all directed at Turks—including the Bundestag debates on the proposed law and
the German government’s own pronouncements. To this day, German government websites dis-
cussing multiple citizenship contain cheery photographs of people displaying two passports—one
is always German and the second one always Turkish.37
I. The reforms of 1999
On March 16, 1999, the bill that eventually became the new German Citizenship Law was intro-
duced in the lower house, the Bundestag. Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor presided over a gov-
ernment in which his Social Democrats (SPD) were in coalition with the Green Party.38 The title of
the bill was, “Draft of a Law to Reform Nationality Law” and the subtitle made the goal of the law
clear: “Improvement of the integration of those foreigners living long term in the FRG and of their
children through easing of the requirements for German citizenship.”39 The original proposal
would have allowed dual, even multiple, citizenship. In the debate on the first reading of the bill,
Germany’s Minister of the Interior said clearly:
Of course, a thorough integration policy is not limited to reform of the citizenship law. But
reform of the citizenship law is an important element of a comprehensive integration policy.
Reform of citizenship law is even more than that: It is the nucleus of a comprehensive inte-
gration policy because integration—I am firmly convinced of this—can only succeed when
through the acquisition of German citizenship citizens of foreign origin can have an equal
participation in German community life.40
He pointed out a poorly-disguised prejudice against Turks that underlay many objections by the
conservative Christian Democrat Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) to dual citizenship,
using as an example the aristocrat Otto von Habsburg, who had served as a CDU/CSUMember of
the European Parliament for over 20 years:
It is strange, that the CDU/CSU doesn’t have a problem with the multiple citizenships of Otto
von Habsburg but want to deny the retention of his previous citizenship to a citizen of
36Germany’s Helmut Kohl “wanted half of Turks sent back,” BBC (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
23544311.
37See, e.g., Debatte über Aufhebung der Optionspflicht [Debate on the Cancellation of the Option Obligation] (July 3, 2014),
http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2014/kw27_ak_optionspflicht/285946 (showing a striking graphic on the
Bundestag’s website, which appears to show a single passport that is both German and Turkish, may have confused some
people into thinking that “Doppelpass,” used as a shorthand for “dual citizenship,” actually meant a single, double-nationality
passport); see also Debatte über Aufhebung der Optionspflicht, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, https://www.bundestag.de/
dokumente/textarchiv/2014/staatsangehoerigkeit/281606.
38For details about the political wrangling that led to the eventual passage of the bill, see Marc M. Howard, The Causes and
Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship Law, 17 GER. POL. 41, 48–51 (2008); Merih Anil, No More Foreigners? The
Remaking of German Naturalization and Citizenship Law, 1990-2000, 29 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 453, 462–66 (2005).
39Gesetzentwurf [Draft Law], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 14/533 http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/
14/005/1400533.pdf.
40Bundestag debate at 2318 (Mar. 19, 1999) (statement of Otto Schily) http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/14028.pdf.
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Turkish origin, who has lived here for decades, does good work, pays his taxes and social
security, leads a law-abiding life and enriches our society culturally as well.41
At the second reading of the bill, Minister Schily stated that he hoped that multiple citizenship
could be avoided but “[f]or us, integration is more important than the avoidance of multiple cit-
izenships.”42 However, the leader of the Free Democrats (FDP) contingent in the Bundestag
wanted to see a demonstration of exclusive loyalty on the part of the would-be German, however:
The state’s offer of integration must be met with an active decision for integration with
this state.
This is true also for the offer to adults of naturalization. A person who wants to become
German should demonstrate this through the renunciation of his former citizenship. The
German passport is not just any old paper that one would like to have in addition to others,
rather it requires a conscious turning toward the German state : : : When a person has lived
in Germany for 20, 30 years, he knows the country, and I think it is fair to require of him a
conscious decision in favor of the country where he lives.43
In a plea both for multiple citizenship and for a waiver for older immigrants from the German
language requirement that the bill would introduce, a Turkish-origin representative from the
Green Party then gave an example of a constituent who wanted to retain his Turkish passport
to ensure that he could be buried in Turkey, with his ancestors.
[Özdemir] This man isn’t trying to get the ability to vote in two places, nor does he care about
some other advantage, it’s a question of simple human things. Would it be such a disaster if
we were generous in these cases, to a small group of people, who came to us in 1973 or before
under the labor agreement?
[Westerwelle] I’m not talking about a disaster here, I’m talking about whether, as a political
matter, we want to require that people who have lived in Germany a long time make a con-
scious decision in favor of the country where they live : : : You and I have different
approaches: For you, integration policy is just the state’s offer of integration, for us integra-
tion policy is the offer by the state of integration and the decision by the individual to accept
the offer.44
On May 7, 1999, the Bundestag passed the Citizenship Law with the votes of the SPD/Greens and
the FDP. Approval by the upper house—the Bundesrat—followed on May 21, 1999, and the law
became effective on January 1, 2000.45
Some commentators called the 1999 law a “revolution,” in that German citizenship was for the
first time made available not only through descent but also by birth in the country (jus soli) and
provision was made for previous citizenship to be retained when naturalizing in Germany.46 The
new changes in the law included that children born in Germany on or after January 1, 2000 would
41Id.; Otto von Habsburg Obituary, THE GUARDIAN (July 4, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/04/otto-
von-habsburg-obituary (stating Von Habsburg, son of the last emperor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, held citizenship in
Germany, Austria, Hungary and the Czech Republic).
42Bundestag debate at 3423 (May 7, 1999) (statement of Otto Schily) http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/14028.pdf.
43Id. at 3436 (statement of Rep. Guido Westerwelle).
44Id. at 3437.
45Stenographischer Bericht 40 Sitzung [40th Report, Results of the Vote], DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN [BT] 14/
3461, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/14040.pdf; see also Kay Hailbronner & Anuscheh Farahat, Country Report:
Germany, EUDO CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY (2015) at 6–7, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34478/EUDO_
CIT_2015_02-Germany.pdf?sequence=1.
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be German citizens if, at the time of their birth, at least one parent had been customarily resident
in Germany for eight years and had the permanent right to remain in the country.47 If the child
acquired two or more citizenships at birth, he was required by his twenty-third birthday to either
choose German citizenship and give up the other(s), or to lose German citizenship.48 This
provision was known as the “Duty to Choose” (Optionspflicht). The acceptance of multiple citizen-
ship was very limited, for persons naturalizing as Germans were still required to give up their
prior citizenship except if: (1) That prior citizenship was from the EU or Switzerland, (2) the prior
citizenship could not be relinquished without “undue difficulty or expense,” or (3) their
prior country of citizenship did not permit them to renounce their citizenship.49
The new law also changed the criteria for naturalization. The period of residence required to
naturalize was reduced from fifteen to eight years. But other aspects of the 1999 law actually made
it harder to naturalize, by requiring proof of ability to support oneself, and introducing integra-
tion-oriented requirements such as an oath of loyalty to the constitution and a German language
competence test. The latter proved particularly difficult for the earliest Turkish arrivals, many of
whom were by then in late middle age. They had not been encouraged or supported in learning
German when they arrived in the country, since they were supposedly “guest workers”
(Gastarbeiter) who would be leaving soon.50 These changes in the naturalization requirements
—which were thought by the German government to be liberalizing—were met with a lack of
interest on the part of Turkish heritage residents. Even after years of publicity and urging by
the German government, the rate at which eligible Turkish residents choose to naturalize lan-
guishes at or below two percent per year.51
Although the new law received much publicity as a break with Germany’s jus sanguinis past,
one provision was not so well publicized: The elimination of the “domestic exemption” that had
allowed Germans living in Germany to acquire a second citizenship, or reacquire their previous
citizenship, while retaining German citizenship. The new law provided that in the absence of prior
“permission to retain” (Beibehaltungsgenehmigung), a German citizen’s acquisition of a second
citizenship—other than in certain European countries—automatically revoked his German citi-
zenship. This created problems for the German and Turkish governments, as apparently Turkish
authorities had continued to allow their former citizens to reacquire Turkish citizenship after
naturalizing in Germany and had not reported this to German authorities so that the loss of
German citizenship could be recorded.
On December 14, 2004, the opposition parties introduced in the Bundestag a resolution entitled
“Don’t Hide the Problems with Turkey.”52 That resolution would have declared it to be the sense
of the Bundestag that the federal government should not vote in the European Council to open
accession talks with Turkey unless certain problems were discussed and Turkey committed to
contributing to their solution.
46See, e.g., H.-P. MANSEL, Zur Reform des Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts 2000 [Regarding the 2000 Reform of the Citizenship
Law], in AUSWIRKUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEITSREFORM [THE IMPACT OF GERMAN CITIZENSHIP LAW
REFORM] 9, 9 (2002).
47STaG § 4, ¶ 3.
48STaG § 29.
49Simon Green, Much Ado About Not-Very-Much? Assessing Ten Years of German Citizenship Reform, 16 CITIZENSHIP
STUD. 173, 181 (2012).
50HELMUT RITTSTIEG, Staatsangehörigkeit, deutsche Leitkultur und die deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen [Citizenship, German‚
Leading Culture and German-Turkish Relations] in AUSWIRKUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEITSREFORM>
[THE IMPACT OF GERMAN CITIZENSHIP LAW REFORM] 13, 14 (2002).
51Einbürgerungen [Naturalizations], STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/
Pressemitteilungen/2017/06/PD17_195_12511.html (In the most recent figures available, between 2009 and 2016, the highest
rate was 2.3% (2012) and the lowest was 1.2% (2016)).
52Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache [BT] 15/4496, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/15/044/1504496.pdf; the “report”
to which the resolution refers was Verbotener Doppelpass [Forbidden dual citizenship], FOCUS (Sept. 27, 2004), http://www.
focus.de/politik/deutschland/diplomatenstreit-verbotener-doppelpass_aid_202183.html.
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Turkey must accept German nationality law; the German government must take steps to
ensure that the practice of re-naturalizing contrary to law is stopped.
A Turkish citizen who wants German citizenship must, in the course of naturalization, abso-
lutely renounce Turkish citizenship : : : [r]ecently it was reported that in the words of the
Turkish Foreign Minister Ugur Ziyal, “40,000 to 50,000 : : : maybe more” Turkish citizens
are illegally in possession of a German passport in a breach of these rules of German citizen-
ship, and that this has occurred with the help of the Turkish government. By decree of 10
September 2001 the Turkish government directed all offices to manipulate the register
extracts demanded by the German government and in this fashion conceal from German
officials the reacquisition of Turkish citizenship : : : The federal government should make
it clear to the Turkish government that such behavior does not result in productive relations
between countries. Also, it cannot be solved merely by the revocation of the decree.
During the debate on this resolution, the ruling coalition admitted that approximately 48,000
Turks had lost their German citizenship after January 1, 2000 by reacquiring Turkish citizenship
after the domestic exemption was revoked. Those persons would need to re-naturalize in
Germany.53 Of even greater concern to the CDU/CSU would have been that between January
1, 2000 and the end of 2004 there were numerous elections in Germany—sixteen elections for
the legislatures of the Länder, one for the Bundestag and one for the European Parliament—
in which these non-citizens could have voted, and Turkish Germans vote overwhelmingly for
parties other than the CDU/CSU.54
II. The Turkish response
Once the news of the elimination of the domestic exception trickled through to the population and
to the Turkish authorities, there was a precipitous drop in the number of Turks who sought formal
release from their citizenship in order to naturalize abroad. In 2000, the number of persons seek-
ing permission to exit was 12,635, which increased in 2001 to 27,576. By 2004, the number
dropped to a mere 1,828.55 Turkish naturalizations in Germany peaked in 1999 at over
100,000, then declined to 19,695 in 2015, and just 16,290 in 2016.56
Turkey could have taken on the challenge of the new German law in a number of ways. It could
have better promoted the pink/blue card. It could have eliminated all remaining restrictions on
inheritance, social security, and property ownership for former Turkish citizens. Or it could have
simply prohibited the renunciation of Turkish citizenship, thereby bringing Turks within the
exception to the German renunciation requirement. But when Turkey’s citizenship law was most
recently amended, in 2009, not one of these changes was made.
Turkish failure to make their citizenship non-renounceable is puzzling because it would solve
the dual citizenship problem and allow Turks to easily take on German citizenship and fully
integrate into German society. The reason cannot be, as has been posited, that it is too difficult
politically to change Turkish citizenship law to accommodate the Turkish diaspora.57 As we have
53Bundestag debate at 14281 (Jan. 21, 2005) (statement of Ute Vogt, Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior),
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/15/15152.pdf.
54Şener Aktürk, The Turkish Minority in German Politics: Trends, Diversification of Representation, and Policy Implications,
12 INSIGHT TURK. 65, 69 (2010); Schwarz, rot, grün – welche Parteien bevorzugen Zuwanderer? [Black, red, green – which
parties do immigrants prefer?], SACHVERSTÄNDIGENRAT DEUTSCHER STIFTUNGEN FÜR INTEGRATION UND MIGRATION
[COUNCIL OF EXPERTS, GERMAN FOUNDATIONS FOR INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION] at 28 (2016) https://www.svr-
migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/PB_Parteipraeferenzen.pdf (70% of Turkish heritage immigrants prefer SPD,
13% Greens, compared to 6% CSU/CSU).
55Kadirbeyoğlu, supra note 26, at 15.
56Einbürgerungen, supra note 51, at 13, 19–42.
57Aktürk, supra note 54, at 75.
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seen previously, the Turkish government has repeatedly created new Turkish laws in response to
changes in German citizenship law—for example, the pink/blue card, and the provision for easy
reacquisition of Turkish citizenship after the renunciation required for naturalization in Germany.
The Turkish government has accommodated its citizens’ desires to naturalize in their countries
of residence because, “the lobbying potential of migrants living in European countries has been
seen as an asset by governments in Turkey.”58 Since coming to power in 2002, the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partısı) (AK Parti) has shown an increasing interest
in the Turkish diaspora, particularly those living in Germany. In 2010, a government department
was set up to deal with Turks abroad, the “Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related
Communities” (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı). In 2012, its Chairman stated
the office’s goals the following:
In its work with the citizens living overseas, the Presidency encourages them to actively par-
ticipate in public life in their respective host countries while preserving their own culture and
supports all efforts in that direction. The Presidency is also responsible for ensuring that
Turkish citizens benefit equally from legal rights in the countries they reside in : : : [i]n
the future, the Presidency will continue prioritizing efforts to help Turkish citizens become
prominent forces in the countries they reside in, work towards ensuring their equal partici-
pation in public life as well as foster a common consciousness amongst them.59
In an address in 2011, then Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdoğan, appearing in Düsseldorf, con-
troversially urged his fellow Turks to “integrate” into German society, but not to “assimilate,” and
to teach their children Turkish first, German second.60 Turks living in Germany—who may feel
that German politicians do not take their concerns seriously—have welcomed Erdoğan as the
champion of the Turkish diaspora.61
One step taken by the Turkish government to bind the diaspora to the motherland—even while
encouraging Turkish citizens to take part in politics in their countries of residence—was to change
Turkish election law. In 2008, that law was amended to allow Turkish citizens abroad to vote in
referenda and presidential elections, the result of a multi-decade campaign by Turks abroad for
this right.62 Previously, Turks living abroad could vote only if they returned to Turkey for election
day, but the 2008 law permitted votes to be cast in a number of different ways: By post, electroni-
cally, at the Turkish border, or in Turkish embassies and consulates abroad. The provision for
postal votes was struck down by the Constitutional Court, tamper-proof electronic voting proved
infeasible, and there were years of delay in negotiating agreements with other countries to allow
voting at Turkish diplomatic missions. Finally, in time for the August 2014 presidential election,
Turks were able to vote from their foreign countries of residence. This had the effect of exporting
the political Sturm und Drang of the Turkish homeland to host countries—even though Article 94
of the Turkish general election law prohibits campaigning outside the borders of Turkey.63
58Kadirbeyoğlu, supra note 26, at 4 (citing Turkish Parliamentary Minutes from June 7, 1995).
59Kemal Yurtnaç, Turkey’s New Horizon: Turks Abroad and Related Communities, 3 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH
6–7, 10 (Oct. 2012), http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SAM_paper_ing_03.pdf.
60You are Part of Germany, but also Part of our Great Turkey, DER SPIEGEL (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/
international/europe/erdogan-urges-turks-not-to-assimilate-you-are-part-of-germany-but-also-part-of-our-great-turkey-a-
748070.html.
61Pastor und Sultan, DER SPIEGEL (May 5, 2014), http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-126830884.html.
62The history of the effort can be found in Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek & M. Murat Erdoğan, The Implementation of Voting
from Abroad: Evidence from the 2014 Turkish Presidential Election, 54 INT’L MIGRATION 173 (2015).
63Shabtai Gold, et al., Turkish Law Prohibits Campaigning Abroad—as Row with Europe Deepens, DEUTSCHE PRESSE
AGENTUR (Mar. 9, 2017), http://www.dpa-international.com/topic/turkish-law-prohibits-campaigning-abroad-row-europe-
deepens-170309-99-595734.
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This outreach to the diaspora is part of the new AK Parti-encouraged vision of Turkey as a
strong country, able to protect its own both at home and abroad. In a 2003 address to migrants,
then Prime Minister Erdoğan stated:
Today, Turkey has reached the situation of being powerful, ambitious, having high goals.
Turkey sets the agenda, instead of its agenda being set by others. Turkey should be taken
into account in considering world affairs : : : [a] powerful country protects her citizens
abroad, kin communities and brothers.64
The economic success of Turkey in the first decade of AK Parti rule, from 2002 to 2012, allowed it
to partially redress the asymmetry of power between itself and other countries, most particularly
Germany. As the larger, richer country, Germany was previously able to determine the conditions
Turks must accept to live in Germany, including the attempted prohibition of dual citizenship.
However, during the AK Parti period, Turkey has challenged this inequality and attempted to
redefine bilateral relations.65
III. More changes by the Germans
The 1999 German law, although “revolutionary,” was flawed from the compromises that were
necessary to secure its passage. Further amendments in 2004 and 2007 resolved various technical
issues and standardized both the level of German language competence required and the test
regarding German life and society, which, until then, differed depending on the German Land
in which the applicant lived.66
These relatively small changes, however, did nothing to ease the prohibition of multiple citizen-
ships for those persons from countries outside the EU and Switzerland. The “Duty to Choose”
(Optionspflicht) that gave temporary dual citizenship under the 1999 law was quickly renamed
“Pressure to Choose” (Optionszwang) by those unhappy with the compromise. Between
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2013, nearly half-a-million German-born children of foreign
parents had temporarily acquired German citizenship, building up a substantial population of
young people who were soon going to be faced with the difficult decision between their
German citizenship and that of their familial homeland.67
Effective December 20, 2014, the Optionspflicht was almost done away with. Now dual citizens
born in Germany may retain their dual citizenship permanently, if by their twenty-first birthday
they have either lived eight years in Germany, attended school there for six years, or graduated
from a German school or training program.68 Dual citizenship is, however, still proscribed for
persons born outside of Germany, unless they fall into one of the previously-granted exemptions:
EU and Swiss citizens, persons who cannot renounce citizenship, or for whom it would be a
substantial problem. The head of the TGD pronounced the law to be “a bitter disappointment”
64Şahin-Mencütek & Erdoğan, supra note 62, at 181 (quoting Prime Minister Erdoğan).
65Id.
66Green, supra note 49, at 178.
67DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHE 18/10788, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/107/1810788.pdf (answering a
parliamentary question).
68BERICHT DER BEAUFTRAGTEN DER BUNDESREGIERUNG FÜR MIGRATION, FLÜCHTLINGE UND INTEGRATION 42 [11th
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONER FOR MIGRATION, REFUGEES AND INTEGRATION - PARTICIPATION,
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE IMMIGRATION SOCIETY GERMANY] (Dec. 2016), https://www.
bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975292/729998/fdcd6fab942558386be0d47d9add51bb/11-lagebericht-09-12-2016-down
load-ba-ib-data.pdf?download=1 [hereinafter BERICHT DER BEAUFTRAGTEN].
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as it made no provision for the older generation: “Those of the first generation who have worked
here for decades and made Germany their home go empty-handed.”69
Although now more than fifty percent of all naturalizations in Germany are to people who
retain their previous citizenship, German law continues to require exceptional measures of many
who wish to hold multiple citizenships.70 The privilege of multiple citizenships is reserved mainly
for native Europeans, to the detriment of the largest immigrant group, the Turks.71
In her 2016 report, the German Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration—
herself a German-born naturalized Turk—has called for an end to the conditions on citizenship
granted to children born in Germany and for the full acceptance of all multiple citizenships.72 This
is a very raw subject with Conservatives. As recently as December 2016, the CDU party conference
called for the end of multiple citizenship and a return to the “Duty to Choose.”73 The abolition of
multiple citizenship was a plank in the CDU manifesto for the September 24, 2017 Bundestag
elections.74 This is in spite of the fact that out of Germany’s population of 81.4 million, over
1.6 million persons currently hold a second citizenship in addition to German, and fifteen percent
of those are Turkish citizens.75
It has been shown that the requirement to give up their Turkish citizenship is the primary
reason Turks have been prevented from naturalizing. The risk of giving up rights to inheritance
and property:
May be perceived as too high a price to pay by many people who already feel cut off from
their families. Of course, there are also cultural and patriotic sentiments that are difficult to
come to grips with, and apparently not many foreigners are willing to abandon their current
citizenship altogether. This sentiment may be especially pronounced for citizens of countries
—like Turkey—that primarily think of citizenship along blood lines.76
69Germany’s Turkish Community Says Let Down by Coalition Deal on Dual Citizenship, Hürriyet Daily News (Nov. 27,
2013), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/germanys-turkish-community-says-let-down-by-coalition-deal-on-dual-citizen
ship.aspx?pageID=238&nID=58654&NewsCatID=351.
70Pusch, supra note 23, at 4–5; Karen Schönwälder & Triadafilos Triadafilopoulous, A Bridge or Barrier to Incorporation?
Germany’s 1999 Citizenship Reform in Critical Perspective, 101 GER. POL. & SOC’Y 52, 55 (2012); Bericht der Beauftragten,
supra note 68, at 40 (stating that in 2015 the figure was 54.2%).
71The TGD has made the recognition of multiple citizenships one of its major goals, so far unsuccessfully. For a history of its
efforts in this regard, see Politische Partizipation, TÜRKISCHE GEMEINDE in Deutschland, http://www.tgd.de/category/themen/
politische-partizipation/.
72BERICHT DER BEAUFTRAGTEN, supra note 68, at 43; Biography of Commissioner Aydan Özoğuz and Deputy Head of the
SPD, https://www.integrationsbeauftragte.de/Webs/IB/DE/AmtUndPerson/Lebenslauf/lebenslauf_node.html.
73Germany’s CDU Votes to Limit Immigrants’ Rights to Dual Citizenship, Financial Times (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.ft.
com/content/557a5ec0-bc7b-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080; Zurück zur Optionspflicht? [Back to the Duty to Choose?], Die Zeit
(Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-12/doppelte-staatsbuergerschaft-cdu-optionspflicht-faq.
74Regierungsprogramm, [Program for Government] 74 (2017), https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/170703
regierungsprogramm2017.pdf?file=1&type=field_collection_item&id=9932; Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland,
[Program for Government] 88 (2017), https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Bundesparteitag_2017/Es_ist_Zeit_
fuer_mehr_Gerechtigkeit-Unser_Regierungsprogramm.pdf (supporting multiple citizenship for both children born in
Germany and for persons naturalizing as German); “Wahlprogramm” [Election Programme] (2017), https://www.fdp.de/
wp-modul/btw17-wp-a-81 (suggesting multiple citizenship for all persons on an equal basis, regardless of their country of
first nationality, but ending with the third generation any dual citizenship based on heritage); “Grundsatzprogramm,”
[Basic Principles] 65 (2017), http://alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/05/2016-06-27_afd-grundsatzpro
gramm_web-version.pdf (suggesting an end to multiple citizenship for all but exceptional cases and revoking the 1999 law’s
introduction of jus soli).
75Migration, supra note 3, at 167 (Micro census of 2015 shows 246,000 dual citizens Turkish/German. The Federal Office of
Statistics says that the actual figure is probably higher, somewhere between 246,000 and the 530,000 counted in the 2011
census).
76Howard, supra note 38, at 56.
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The tide of history is against countries such as Germany which penalize multiple citizenships. This
shift can be demonstrated on a macro scale by the 1997 European Convention on Nationality
which, although remaining neutral on the issue of multiple nationality, does not discourage
it.77 This is a striking change of position as compared to the 1963 Convention on that subject,
which required the loss of citizenship for European citizens naturalizing in another treaty country:
“Nationals of the Contracting Parties who are of full age and who acquire of their own free will, by
means of naturalization, option or recovery, the nationality of another Party shall lose their former
nationality. They shall not be authorized to retain their former nationality.”78 The current German
position is now completely different from that of the 1963 Convention—applicants from other
“Contracting Parties” are automatically allowed to keep their first citizenship.
IV. Turks vote in Germany—in Turkish elections
In the June 2015 Turkish election, Turks voted from a total of fifty-four different countries.79 The
AK Parti has been rewarded for its efforts on behalf of expatriates, consistently winning their votes
in proportions exceeding those realized in the motherland.80
The largest concentration of expatriate Turks is to be found in Germany, and it has been in
Germany that the problems with foreign voting have been the most pronounced. Almost 40,000
people gathered in Cologne for a pro-Erdoğan rally after the July 2016 attempted coup, prompting
Chancellor Angela Merkel to admonish German-resident Turks that, “we expect them to develop
a high degree of loyalty to our country.”81 The run-up to the April 18, 2017 Turkish referendum
on constitutional change memorably produced strife when Turkish government representatives
were refused permission to hold rallies in Germany.82
It was not only the Turkish electioneering that provoked debate in Germany, but also the result
of that constitutional referendum election, in which sixty-three percent of German-resident Turks
voted for the proposed changes, as compared to just fifty-one percent in the total vote. This did
nothing to reassure nervous German voters that the Turks who they were inviting to become citi-
zens actually share the beliefs in the rule of law and constitutional government that they would
swear to in their naturalization oath. Apparently without irony, German politicians from the
ascendant right-wing “Alternative for Germany” (Alternative für Deutschland), invited the
Turks who were in favor of authoritarianism to return to their own country where they could
enjoy it all they wanted.83 Turkish journalist Can Dündar, living in exile in Germany,
77See Convention on Nationality, supra note 10, at (C 5) 14 (stating that member states “shall allow” multiple nationality
where it is acquired automatically through birth or marriage).
78Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality,
Mar. 23, 1963 O. J. pmbl. & (C 1) 1, § 1, https://rm.coe.int/168006b659.
79Zeynep Kadirbeyoğlu & Asli Okyay, Turkey: Voting from abroad in 2015 general elections, GLOBALCIT (Aug. 6, 2015),
http://globalcit.eu/voting-from-abroad-in-turkey-s-general-elections-2015/.
80See Kritik an Doppelpass—das sind die Fakten [Critique of Dual Citizenship—Here are the Facts], DER SPIEGEL (Dec. 7,
2016), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/doppelte-staatsbuergerschaft-und-doppelpass-das-sind-die-fakten-a-1124805.
html (stating the results of the 2014 presidential election, where 59.7% of Turkish voters in Germany voted for the AK
Parti as opposed to just 49% in Turkey itself).
81Ben Knight, Angela Merkel calls for ‘loyalty’ from German Turks, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 23, 2016) http://www.dw.com/
en/angela-merkel-calls-for-loyalty-from-german-turks/a-19496043; Old Fault Lines, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2016), https://
www.economist.com/news/europe/21703296-tensions-rise-turkey-they-spill-over-germany-old-faultlines.
82Alissa J. Rubin, Erdogan Calls Dutch “Nazi Remnants” After Turkish Minister Is Barred, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/europe/turkey-netherlands-ban-referendum.html?_r=0; Turkey’s Erdogan says
German leaders are enemies, BBC (Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40973197 (stating Erdoğan
has since returned the favor by labelling the CDU/CSU, SPD and the Greens all “enemies of Turkey” and urging Turkish
heritage German citizens to vote for other parties).
83Justin Huggler, Senior German Politicians Call for Changes to Dual Citizenship Laws after German Turks Vote to Increase
Erdogan’s Powers, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/18/senior-german-politicians-
call-changes-dual-citizenship-laws/.
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explained the vote in terms of identity rather than ideology, saying that Turks voted pragmati-
cally for a Turkish leader who offered them an identity that Germany could not or would not
give them.84
D. Pressure points and some solutions
I. Consular assistance
There have been several recent high-profile cases in Turkey when German officials were prohib-
ited from visiting dual German-Turkish citizens held in Turkish custody. Although seemingly
harsh, the Turkish refusal of such visits is entirely consistent with international law. True, the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ratified by both Germany and Turkey, guarantees that
consular officers “shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have
access to them”—consular officers have the right to visit their country’s nationals in detention, to
correspond with them, and to arrange for legal representation.85 This right, however, does not
apply when the person is a citizen of the country in which he is being held.
The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
clearly provides that “[a] State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against
a State whose nationality such person also possesses.”86 Although only a dozen countries have
ratified the Convention—excluding both Germany and Turkey—the non-responsibility principle
it contains appears to have merely codified existing customary international law which continues
to be followed even by countries that never adopted the Convention.87 This principle is not widely
understood; even the German Ministry of the Interior lists “consular protection while abroad” as
one of the advantages of naturalizing in Germany, without mentioning that this protection is not
available to a German dual citizen who travels to his other country of nationality.88
Among the best known of the recent arrestees is Deniz Yücel, a journalist for Die Welt and
citizen of both Germany and Turkey, who was arrested on February 14, 2017 and held for over
a year before charges were dropped.89 Meşale Tolu, also a German-Turkish journalist born in
Germany, was arrested and thereafter denied German consular assistance for months, even
though she gave up Turkish citizenship in 2007.90 The German press called them Erdoğan’s
hostages, claiming that the Turkish government was holding German citizens (three of them,
including Tolu and the human rights campaigner Peter Steudtner, are uniquely German
84Meine Türkei & Almanyadaki Türkler, Oylarını versinler!, ZEIT ONLINE, (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.zeit.de/kultur/2017-
04/verfassungsreferendum-tuerkei-deutsch-tuerken-meine-tuerkei-tuerkisch.
85Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 8638 U.N.T.S. 262, https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/UNTS/Volume%20596/volume-596-I-8638-English.pdf.
86Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 4, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 U.N.T.S.
115, https://treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?src=LON&id=516&chapter=30&clang=_en.
87Craig Forcese, The Capacity to Protect: Diplomatic Protection of Dual Nationals in the “War on Terror”, 17 EUR. J. OF INT’L
L. 369, 385, note 80 (2006) (collecting authorities).
88Einbürgerung [Naturalization], BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN, FÜR BAU UND HEIMAT [THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF
THE INTERIOR, FOR CONSTRUCTION AND HOME], http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Migration-Integration/Einbuer
gerung/einbuergerung_node.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2018).
89Andrea Shalal & Ece Toksabay, Germany summons Turkish ambassador, seeks release of jailed journalist, REUTERS
(Feb. 28, 2017), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-security-germany-journalist-idUKKBN1662FM; Journalist for
German newspaper arrested in Turkey, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/27/
journalist-for-german-newspaper-arrested-in-turkey; Deniz Yücel auf dem Weg zum Flughafen [Deniz Yücel on
his way to the airport] SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 18, 2018) http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/deniz-yuecel-kommt-frei-a-
1193864.html.
90Imprisoned German national in Turkey receives consular visit, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 2, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/
imprisoned-german-national-in-turkey-receives-consular-visit/a-39098071; German journalist Mesale Tolu Arrives Home
after Turkey Lifts Travel Ban, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/german-journalist-mesale-tolu-
arrives-home-after-turkey-lifts-travel-ban/a-45233372 (stating that she was released from detention in December 2017 but
was not permitted to leave Turkey until August 2018; terror-related charges are still pending).
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citizens)91 for possible exchange against the return to Turkey of high-ranking asylum seekers.
According to German sources, President Erdoğan told the German Foreign Minister that he would
release Deniz Yücelin exchange for the return of two Turkish generals who sought asylum in
Germany after the 2016 coup attempt. President Erdoğan is quoted as having told a German rep-
resentative on May 30, 2017, “[i]f you don’t help us by turning these people over, then you must
[realize] that in the future you are not going to get back from us those people that you want.”92
Germany and Turkey should agree that as between their two countries they will allow full
access to consular assistance from the other country of citizenship. The imposition on Turkey
—that is, the German intrusion into Turkish criminal proceedings—will be relatively small,
for even now there are only fifty-five German citizens being held by Turkish authorities, with
twelve of these cases being described as “political.”93 In exchange, Turkey would gain the ability
to visit dual citizens in German prisons and be able to demonstrate yet another way in which it is a
big, strong country that is able to take care of its citizens, wherever they may live.
II. The Germans and multiple citizenship
German law must face up to German reality and allow multiple citizenship. Only then will the
stagnant naturalization rates begin to rise. This is not a “Turkish problem,” it is a widespread
problem for citizens of all nationalities in Germany other than those from the EU and
Switzerland. In 2015 only 1.3% of all foreigners in the FRG naturalized, one of the three lowest
rates in twenty-five years, and exactly half the rate in the rest of the EU.94 As stated by the office of
Migration, Refugees and Integration:
For theCommissioner, in view of the continuing lownaturalization rate, the general acceptance
of multiple citizenships in naturalization cases continues to be a goal toward which to strive.
Holding fast to the principle of the avoidance of multiple citizenships is ever less defensible in
naturalization cases, given that already more than half of all naturalizations (53.6% in 2014)
involve the retention of prior citizenship, that multiple citizenship has always been accepted
for the children of binational families, and that after the latest amendment to the Option
Law, multiple citizenships are permitted for the jus soli Germans who have grown up here.95
The Federal Supreme Administrative Court came to the same conclusion, finding that the changes
introduced in 1999 and 2004 show that the legislative branch of the government “now lays less
weight upon the avoidance of dual or multiple citizenship” than previously, and “the private inter-
est of the individual in the establishment or retention of a dual or multiple citizenship is to be
placed equal with the public interest of the avoidance of multiple citizenship.”96
91Deutsche Übersetzerin sitzt in der Türkei in Haft, [German Translator in Turkish Jail], ÖZGÜRÜZ (May 12, 2017), https://
ozguruz.org/de/2017/05/12/mesale-tolu/.
92Erdogans Geisel, [Erdogan’s hostages], SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 2, 2017), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/mesale-tolu-
in-der-tuerkei-wie-geht-es-der-deutschen-in-erdogan-haft-a-1150340.html; see also Andrea Thomas & Anton Troianovski,
Tensions Escalate Between Turkey and Germany, THE WALL STREET J. (July 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
tensions-escalate-between-germany-and-turkey-1501148072?mod=e2tweu; see also Sigmar Gabriel, Sevgili Türk
hemşerilerim [My Dear Turkish Fellow Citizens], BILD (July 24, 2017), http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/sigmar-gabriel/
sevgili-tuerk-hemerilerim-52627324.bild.html.
93Deutschland verliert die Geduld mit der Türkei, [Germany loses patience with Turkey] FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG (Sept. 3, 2017), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/festgenommene-deutsche-deutschland-verliert-die-geduld-
mit-der-tuerkei-15181648.html.
94BERICHT DER BEAUFTRAGTEN, supra note 68, at 430.
95Id. at 433.
96BVERWGE, Apr. 10, 2008, 5 C 28.07, http://www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen/pdf/100408U5C28.07.0.pdf.
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E. Conclusion
The Turkish-German relationship is of great importance to both countries. Germany is Turkey’s
largest trading partner, and people of Turkish heritage make up the largest immigrant group in
Germany. Regardless of the harsh words exchanged recently, and the curtain of authoritarianism
that is descending across Turkey, the countries will continue to be inextricably entwined. Even
without the cooperation of the Turkish government, the German government can take steps
to improve the integration of its Turkish heritage residents, including, but not limited to, making
naturalization more attractive by permitting dual citizenship.
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